We consider a coalition formation se ing where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition.
INTRODUCTION
At a conference dinner, researchers split into groups to chat over food. Some junior researchers prefer to stay in the company of other junior researchers, as they want to relax a er a long day of talks. Some senior researchers prefer to chat with their friends, who also happen to be senior researchers. But there are also junior researchers who want to use the dinner as an opportunity to network with senior researchers, as well as senior researchers who are eager to make the newcomers feel welcome in the community, and therefore want to talk to as many junior people as possible.
is example can be viewed as an instance of a coalition formation problem. e agents belong to two types (senior and junior), and their preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of agents of each type in the coalition. is se ing is reminiscent of the classic Schelling model [Schelling, 1969] , but there is an important di erence: a standard assumption in the Schelling model is homophily, i.e., the agents are assumed to prefer to be surrounded by agents of their own type, though they can tolerate the presence of agents of the other type, as long as their fraction does not exceed a pre-speci ed threshold. In contrast, in our example some agents have homophilic preferences, while others have heterophilic preferences, i.e., they seek out coalitions with agents who are not like them.
ere is a very substantial body of research on homophily and heterophily in group formation. It is well-known that in a variety of contexts, ranging from residential location [Schelling, 1969 , Zhang, 2004a to classroom activities and friendship relations [Moody, 2001 , Newman, 2010 , individuals prefer to be together with those who are similar to them. ere are also se ings where agents prefer to be in a group with agents of the other type(s): for instance, in a coalition of buyers and sellers, a buyer prefers to be in a group with many other sellers and no other buyers, so as to maximize their negotiating power. Aziz et al. [2017 Aziz et al. [ , 2014 model this scenario as a Bakers and Millers game, where a baker wants to be in a coalition with many millers, whereas a miller wants to be in a coalition with many bakers. However, there are also real-life scenarios where agents can have di erent a itudes towards diversity: this includes, for instance, language learning by immersion (with types being learners' native languages), shared accommodation (with types being genders), primary and secondary education (with types being races and income groups), etc. In all these se ings we expect the agents to display a broad range of preferences over ratios of di erent types in their group.
Our contribution e goal of our paper is to provide strategic foundations for the study of coalition formation scenarios where each agent may have a di erent degree of homophily. More concretely, we consider se ings where agents are divided into two types (blue and red), and each agent has preferences regarding the fraction of the agents of her own type, which determine her preferences over coalitions. For most of our results, we assume that agents' preferences are single-peaked, i.e., each agent has a preferred ratio θ of agents of her own type, and prefers one fraction θ 1 to another fraction θ 2 if θ 1 is closer to θ than θ 2 is. Our model allows agents to express a variety of preferences including both complete homophily and complete heterophily.
We model this se ing as a hedonic game, and investigate the existence of stable outcomes according to several established notions of stability, such as core stability, Nash stability and individual stability [Banerjee et al., 2001, Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002] .
We demonstrate that a core stable outcome may fail to exist, even when all agents have singlepeaked preferences. Moreover, we show that deciding whether a core stable outcome exists is NP-complete. However, we identify several interesting special cases where the core is guaranteed to be non-empty.
We then consider stability notions that are de ned in terms of individual deviations. ere is a simple reason why a Nash stable outcome may fail to exist. However, we propose an e cient algorithm to reach an individually stable outcome, i.e., an outcome where if some agent would like to deviate from her current coalition to another coalition, at least one agent in the target coalition would object to the move. Our proof employs a careful and non-trivial adaptation of the algorithm of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] for single-peaked anonymous games. Our algorithm is decentralized in the sense that, by following a certain set of rules, the agents can form a stable partition by themselves.
Related work Our work is related to the established line of research that studies the impact of homophily on residential segregation. e seminal paper of omas Schelling [Schelling, 1969] introduced a model of residential segregation in which two types of individuals are located on a line, and at each step a randomly chosen individual moves to a di erent location if the fraction of the like-minded agents in her neighborhood is below her tolerance ratio. With simple experiments using dimes and pennies, Schelling [1969] found that any such dynamics almost always reaches a total segregation even if each agent only has a mild preference for her own type.
Following numerous papers empirically con rming Shelling's result [Alba and Logan, 1993 , Clark, 2008 , Clark and Fosse , 2008 , Emerson et al., 2001 , Farley et al., 1993 , Massey et al., 1994 , v. d. Laan Bouma-Do , 2007 , Young [1998] was the rst to provide a rigorous theoretical argument, showing that stability can only be achieved if agents are divided into homogeneous groups. In contrast, Brandt et al. [2012] showed that with tolerance parameter being exactly 1 2 , the average size of the monochromatic community is independent of the size of the whole system; subsequently, Immorlica et al. [2017] extended this analysis to the two-dimensional grid. e recent work of Chauhan et al. [2018] considers a more general utility function, taking into account both the fraction of the like-minded agents in the neighborhood and the location in which each agent is situated; they investigate the existence of stable outcomes for several topologies, such as a grid and a ring.
We note, however, that our model is fundamentally di erent from Shelling's model, for at least three reasons. First, we do not assume any underlying topology that restricts coalition formation. Second, the coalitions in an outcome of a hedonic game are pairwise disjoint, while the neighborhoods in the Schelling model may overlap. Finally, as argued above, our model does not assume homophilic preferences.
ere is also a substantial literature on stability in hedonic games, starting with the early work of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] . Among the various classes of hedonic games, two classes are particularly relevant for our analysis: fractional hedonic games [Aziz et al., 2017 [Aziz et al., , 2014 and anonymous hedonic games [Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002] .
In fractional hedonic games the agents are located on a social network, and they prefer a coalition C to a coalition C if the fraction of their friends in C is higher than in C . e Bakers and Millers game is an example of a fractional hedonic game, where it is assumed that each baker is a friend of each miller, but no two agents of the same type are friends. Aziz et al. [2017 Aziz et al. [ , 2014 , and, subsequently, Bilò et al. [2014 Bilò et al. [ , 2015 identify several special cases of fractional hedonic games where the set of core stable outcomes is non-empty. In particular, Aziz et al. [2017 Aziz et al. [ , 2014 give a characterization of the set of strictly core stable outcomes in the Bakers and Millers game.
In anonymous hedonic games agents' preferences over coalitions depend on the size of these coalitions only. Similarly to our se ing, it is known that with single-peaked anonymous preferences, there is a natural decentralized process to reach individual stability; however, a core stable outcome may fail to exist [Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002] , and deciding the existence of a core stable outcome is NP-complete [Ballester, 2004] .
ere are also other subclasses of hedonic games where stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist, such as acyclic hedonic games [Demange, 2004, Igarashi and Elkind, 2016] , dichotomous games [Peters, 2016] , and top-responsive games [Alcade and Revilla, 2004] .
OUR MODEL
For every positive integer s, we denote by [s] the set {1, . . . , s}. We start by de ning the class of games that we are going to consider.
De nition 2.1. A diversity game is a triple G = (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ), where R and B are disjoint sets of agents and for each agent i ∈ R ∪ B it holds that i is a linear order over the set Θ = r s r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |R|}, s ∈ {1, . . . , |R| + |B|} .
We set N = R ∪ B; the agents in R are called the red agents, and the agents in B are called the blue agents.
We refer to subsets of N as coalitions. For each i ∈ N , we denote by N i the set of coalitions containing i. For each coalition S ⊆ N , we say that S is mixed if it contains both red and blue agents; a mixed coalition S is called a mixed pair if |S | = 2.
For each agent i ∈ N , we interpret the order i as her preferences over the fraction of the red agents in a coalition; for instance, if 2 3 i 3 5 , this means that agent i prefers a coalition in which two thirds of the agents are red to a coalition in which three hs of the agents are red.
For each coalition S, we denote by θ R (S) the fraction of the red agents in S, i.e., θ R (S) = |S ∩R | |S | ; we refer to this fraction as the red ratio of S. For each i ∈ N and S,T ∈ N i , we say that agent i strictly prefers S to T if θ R (S) i θ R (T ), and we say that i weakly prefers
A coalition S is said to be individually rational if every agent i in S weakly prefers S to {i}.
An outcome of a diversity game is a partition of agents in N into disjoint coalitions. Given a partition π of N and an agent i ∈ N , we write π (i) to denote the unique coalition in π that contains i. A partition π of N is said to be individually rational if all coalitions in π are individually rational.
e core is the set of partitions that are resistant to group deviations. Formally, we say that a coalition S ⊆ N blocks a partition π of N if every agent i ∈ S strictly prefers S to her own coalition π (i). A partition π of N is said to be core stable, or in the core, if no coalition S ⊆ N blocks π .
We also consider outcomes that are immune to individual deviations. Consider an agent i ∈ N and a pair of coalitions S N i and T ∈ N i . An agent j ∈ S accepts a deviation of i to S if j weakly prefers S ∪ {i} to S. A deviation of i from T to S is said to be an NS-deviation if i prefers S ∪ {i} to T ; and an IS-deviation if it is an NS-deviation and all agents in S accept it. A partition π is called Nash stable (NS) (respectively, individually stable (IS)) if no agent i ∈ N has an NS-deviation (respectively, an IS-deviation) from π (i) to another coalition S ∈ π or to ∅.
We say that the preferences i of an agent i ∈ N are single-peaked if for every i ∈ N there is a peak p i ∈ [0, 1] such that
In particular, if an agent has a strong preference for being in the majority, then her preferences are single-peaked, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.2 (Birds of a feather ock together). Suppose that all agents in R are smokers and all agents in B are non-smokers. en we expect an agent to prefer groups with the maximum possible ratio of agents of her own type. Formally, for each r ∈ R and each θ, θ ∈ Θ we have θ r θ if and only if θ > θ , and for each b ∈ B and each θ, θ ∈ Θ we have θ b θ if and only if θ < θ . In this case, the partition in which each agent forms a singleton coalition is core stable and Nash stable (and hence also individually stable). Fig. 1 . Single-peaked preferences over the ratios of red agents. The thick, grey, and do ed lines represent the preferences of agents in X , Y , and Z , respectively. We omit the ratios 1 3 , 1 2 , 2 3 since there is no individually rational coalition with these fractions of red agents.
P
. Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a core stable outcome π . We note that, by individual rationality, θ R (S) 3/4 for every mixed coalition S ∈ π , as red agents in a coalition S with θ R (S) 5/7 < 3/4 would strictly prefer to be alone. Also, π contains at least one mixed coalition, as otherwise {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , b 1 } would block π .
Let θ * be the largest ratio of red agents in a mixed coalition in π . We have argued that θ * 3/4. Also, if 3/4 θ * 4/5, then θ R (π (x)) 4/5 for all x ∈ X and 3/4 θ R (π (r 5 )) 4/5 or θ R (π (r 5 )) = 1; thus coalition X ∪ Y with θ R (X ∪ Y ) = 5/6 blocks π . Hence, θ * 5/6. Now since π contains at least one mixed coalition with red ratio at least 5/6, and all mixed coalitions in π must have red ratio at least 3/4, if there is more than one mixed coalition, the number of agents would be at least 10, a contradiction. us, π contains exactly one mixed coalition of red ratio at least 5/6. It follows that for each agent i it holds that either
• i belongs to a mixed coalition of red ratio at least 5/6, i.e., θ R (π (i)) 5/6; or • i belongs to a completely homogeneous coalition, i.e., if i ∈ Y , then θ R (π (i)) = 0 and if
In particular, this means that θ R (π (z)) 3/4 for all z ∈ Z , and hence each z ∈ Z prefers 3/4 to θ R (π (z)). Now suppose that r 5 does not belong to a coalition with his favorite red ratio, i.e., 5/6. en θ R (π (r 5 )) 6/7 and thus r 5 prefers 3/4 to θ R (π (r 5 )). us, the coalition Y ∪ Z of red ratio 3/4 blocks π , a contradiction. Hence, r 5 belongs to a coalition of his favorite red ratio 5/6, and thus θ * = 5/6. Further, if some agent r ∈ X ∩ R does not belong to a mixed coalition, then θ R (π (r )) = 1 and the coalition {r } ∪Z would block π . Hence, the unique mixed coalition of red ratio 5/6 contains both r 5 and all four red agents in X , which means that no red agent in Z belongs to the mixed coalition. Now we have:
• each x ∈ X ∩ R prefers 6/7 to θ R (π (x)) = 5/6; and • each z ∈ Z ∩ R prefers 6/7 to θ R (π (z)) = 1.
en coalition X ∪ (Z ∩ R) of red ratio 6/7 would block π , a contradiction. We conclude that G does not admit a core stable partition.
Indeed, we can show that checking whether a given diversity game has a non-empty core is NP-complete. T 3.3. e problem of checking whether a diversity game G = (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) has a non-empty core is NP-complete.
. Checking core stability can be done in polynomial time and hence our problem is in NP. Indeed, for each size of a coalition s ∈ [n] and each number r ∈ {0} ∪ [|R|], we can check in polynomial time if there is a blocking coalition of size s including r red players: We consider the set S s,r of all players who strictly prefer the ratio r s to their ratio under π and verify whether S s,r admits a subset of size at least s that contains r red players; if this is the case, there is a coalition of size exactly s that strongly blocks π . If no such coalition exists, π is core stable.
We reduce from the problem of deciding whether the core of an anonymous hedonic game is non-empty. A hedonic game is called anonymous if all players only care about the sizes of their coalition. Formally, an anonymous hedonic game is a pair (N , (> i ) i ∈N ), where N is a set of agents and for each agent i ∈ N it holds that > i is a linear order over the set [|N |] of coalition sizes. Ballester [Ballester, 2004] has shown that deciding whether the core of an anonymous hedonic game is non-empty is NP-hard.
Let n be the number of players and let the preferences of the players be encoded as follows
where s(i, ) denotes th most preferred the coalition size of agent i. 1 We construct our equivalent hedonic diversity game instance as follows. First, for each original player we introduce one blue agent
Naturally, the preferences of the original player a i with respect to coalitions of size s shall be represented by the preference of player b i with respect to coalitions with s blue players and exactly one red player. For each possible coalition size 1 t n from the original game, we introduce n/t + 1 red players r t that would accept to be in a coalition with t blue player and otherwise prefer to be alone:
If we could guarantee that every mixed coalition has at most one red player, then, the correctness proof would be almost immediate. It might, however, happen that there are coalitions with more then one red player. In the following correctness proof, we will see that these coalitions are unproblematic.
Formally, we show that the core of the original anonymous hedonic game is non-empty if and only if the core of the newly constructed hedonic diversity game is non-empty.
For the rst direction, assume that the core of the anonymous game was non-empty. at means there is a partition π = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k } of the original players into coalitions so that no blocking coalition exists. We build a core-stable partition π = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k , P R } of our newly constructed hedonic diversity game instance from π as follows: P j = {b i | a i ∈ P j } ∪ {r t }, where t = |P j | and = |{P x | x j ∧ |P x | = t }| and P R = R \ ( P j ) simply contains all remaining red players. Assume towards a contradiction that there was a blocking coalition C * of players that blocks π . We rst argue that we can assume w.l.g. that C * contains at most one red player. Of course, C * cannot contain only red players because every red player in π is either in P R and, thus, already only with other red players or it is by de nition of π in one of its most preferred coalition. Now, assume C * contains red players. By the de nition of the preferences of the red players, |C * | must be the red player's most preferred coalition ratio. at is, the number of blue players in C * must be divisible by .
is immediately implies that there is a smaller blocking coalition C * * which consists of one aribitrary red player from C * and (|C * | − )/ arbitrary blue players from C * . Finally, C * (now containing exactly one red player) can only be blocking because every blue player prefers a coalition with one red and |C * | − 1 blue players towards its current coalition in π . e way we constructed the preferences of of blue players ensures that this implies that the coalition C A = {a i | b i ∈ C * } must be a blocking coalition for π -a contradiction.
For the second direction, assume that the core of the diversity game was non-empty. at means there is a partition π = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k , P R } of the blue and red players into coalitions so that no blocking coalition exists. We assume w.l.g. that all coalitions P j are mixed and P R contains only red players. First, there could exist multiple purely red coalitions but merging them into one gives a partition that must be core stable if and only if the original partition was. Second, we can easily observe that P R is non-empty, because no player prefers mixed coalitions with a majority of red players and there are much more red than blue players. ird, a purely blue coalition cannot exist. Every blue player prefers coalitions with as many red as blue players to those coalitions and there are always enough red players available that would be willing to pair up. (Since one of the s(i, ) equals 1, ratio 1 2 is preferred to 0.) Finally, for each integer 1 t n coalition P R must contain at least one red player r t which would prefer to be in a coalition with t blue players. Let us refer to this number as (t).
Furthermore, we can assume that w.l.g. each P j contains at exactly one red player. Every red player that is contained in some P j must be in a coalition that has the player's most preferred ratio of red player, otherwise the player would be in P R . In particular, this means that if there are red players in P j , then all these players must be of the same type and prefer coalitions with a ratio of (t +1) red players for some integer t. Clearly, spli ing up P j into coalitions with exactly one red player and exactly t blue players will give us another core stable partition, because these new coaltions have exactly the same ratio as P j has.
With all these assumptions, we are now ready to de ne a partition π = {P 1 , . . . , P k } for the players of the original anonymous hedonic game instance via P j = {a i | b i ∈ P j }. Finally, assume towards a contradiction that there would be a coalition C A that blocks π . en, using our assumptions on π and the de nition of the players preferences, the coalition C * = {b i | a i ∈ C A } ∪ r t , where t = |C A | and = (t), would be a blocking coalition for π : Player r t comes from P R and, hence, clearly prefers C * and the blue players, by de nition of their preferences, prefer C * if and only if the corresponding original players prefer a size t coalition towards their current ones-a contradiction that there is a blocking coalition for π .
In Example 3.1 there are at least two agents of each type. In contrast, if one of the types is represented by a single agent, then the core is guaranteed to be non-empty. P 3.4. Let G = (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) be a diversity game with |R| = 1 or |B| = 1. en the core of G is non-empty, and a partition in the core can be constructed in polynomial time.
. Without loss of generality, assume that R = {r }. Let Θ r be the set of ratios of red agents in individually rational coalitions to which r belongs, i.e.,
Take r 's favorite ratio θ * among the fractions in Θ r . Construct a coalition S * with θ R (S * ) = θ * and put the rest of blue agents into singletons. Clearly, the resulting partition π is not blocked by any coalition of blue agents. Also, if there exists a coalition S that contains the red agent r and blocks π , then θ R (S) r θ * and S is individually rational, contradicting the choice of θ * . us, the resulting partition is core stable.
We also note that in the game in Example 3.1 agents' preferences belong to one of the three categories. e next proposition shows that if all agents have the same preferences, then there is a core stable outcome. We conjecture that with only two types of single-peaked preferences, the core is non-empty as well. P 3.5. Let G = (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) be a diversity game such that each agent has the same preference over Θ \ {0, 1}. en G has a non-empty core and a partition in the core can be constructed in polynomial time.
. We claim that our game satis es the top coalition property: for each S ⊆ N , there exists a top coalition T ⊆ S such that every agent in T weakly prefers T to every other coalition contained in S. Indeed, take any S ⊆ N . If there is an agent i ∈ S who weakly prefers his own coalition {i} to every mixed coalition contained in S, then taking T = {i} certi es the existence of a top coalition. us, suppose otherwise, i.e., every agent in S strictly prefers some mixed coalition to his own singleton. As every agent has the same ranking over the fractions of red agents in mixed coalitions, there is a mixed coalition T ⊆ S such that θ R (T ) is the favorite red ratio for every agent in T among the ratios of red agents in the subsets of S, which means that T is a top coalition. is argument also gives us an e cient algorithm for identifying a top coalition: it su ces to check whether some singleton forms a top coalition, and, if not, nd the agents' most preferred ratio that can be implemented in Θ \ {0, 1} and construct a coalition with this red ratio.
We can now construct a stable partition by repeatedly identifying a top coalition with respect to the current set of agents, adding it to the partition, and removing the agents in that coalition from the current set of agents; it is clear that this procedure can be executed in polynomial time, and Banerjee et al. [2001] argue that it produces a core stable outcome.
NASH STABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL STABILITY
We have seen that core stability may be impossible to achieve. It is therefore natural to ask whether every diversity game has an outcome that is immune to individual deviations. It is easy to see that the answer is 'no' if we consider NS-deviations, even if we restrict ourselves to single-peaked preferences: for instance, the game where there is one red agent who prefers to be alone and one blue agent who prefers to be in a mixed coalition has no Nash stable outcomes.
In contrast, each diversity game with single-peaked preferences admits an individually stable outcome. Moreover, such an outcome can be computed in polynomial time. In the remainder of this section, we will present an algorithm that achieves this, and prove that it is correct. e algorithm will be divided into three parts:
(1) For agents with peaks greater than half, make mixed coalitions with red majority. For agents with peaks smaller than half, make mixed coalitions with blue majority. (2) Make pairs from the remaining red agents and blue agents who are not in the mixed coalitions. (3) Put all the remaining agents into singletons.
We will rst show that one can construct a sequence of mixed coalitions with red majority that are immune to IS-deviations. Fig. 2 . Illustration of how HALF(R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) creates coalitions with red majority. Gray circles correspond to red agents, while white circles correspond to blue agents.
Create mixed coalitions with red majority
In making mixed coalitions, we will employ a technique that is similar to the algorithm for anonymous games proposed by Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] . Intuitively, imagine that red agents and blue agents with peaks at least 1/2 form two lines, each of which is ordered from the highest peak to the lowest peak. e agents enter a room in this order, with a single blue agent entering rst and red agents successively joining it as long as the fraction of red agents does not exceed the minimum peak of the agents already in the room. Once the fraction of the red agents reaches the minimum peak, a red agent who enters the room may deviate to a coalition that has been formed before. We alternate these two procedures as long as there is a red agent who can be added without exceeding the minimum peak. If no red agent can enter a room, then agents start entering another room and create a new mixed coalition in the same way. e algorithm terminates if either all red agents or all blue agents with their peaks at least half join a mixed coalition. Figure 2 illustrates this coalition formation process. We formalize this idea in Algorithm 1. We will create mixed coalitions containing exactly one blue agent, so we de ne the virtual peak q i to be the favorite ratio of agent i among the ratios of red agents in coalitions containing exactly one blue agent.
In what follows, we assume that S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S k are the nal coalitions that have been obtained at the termination of the algorithm, and that π is the output returned by the algorithm. For each t > 0 and i ∈ S t ,
• i is called a default agent of S t if i is a blue agent or i is a red agent who has joined S t at
Step 9; • i is called a new agent of S t if i is a red agent who has joined S t in Step 14 or Step 19.
We denote by D t the set of default agents of S t , and we denote by N t the set of new agents of S t .
For each S t with t > 0, each agent in S t is either a default agent of a new agent. Notice that S 0 starts with the empty set and plays the role of the last resort option for red agents, i.e., red agents can always deviate to S 0 if they strictly prefer staying alone to the mixed coalition they have joined. Deviations of blue agents We will rst show that the algorithm constructs a sequence of coalitions such that no blue agent in the coalitions has an IS-deviation to other coalitions. We establish this by proving a sequence of claims. First, it is immediate that the red ratio of each coalition S t is at least half, except for the last coalition, which may contain a single blue agent. L 4.1. For each S ∈ π , the red ratio of S is at least half, i.e., θ R (S) 1 2 . P . Take any S ∈ π . e claim is immediate when S ⊆ S 0 . Suppose that S = S t for some t > 0. en it is clear that S t contains exactly one blue agent. If S t contains no red agent, then this would mean that all red agents with their peaks at least half joined S t , but deviated to smaller indexed-coalitions, meaning that S t is the last coalition that has been formed, i.e., t = k; but this contradicts the construction in Step 21. us, S t contains exactly one blue agent and at least one red agent, which implies that θ R (S t ) 1 2 . is leads to the following lemma.
Algorithm 1: HALF(R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B )
input : A single-peaked diversity game (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) output : π 1 sort red and blue agents so that q r 1 q r 2 . . . q r x and q b 1 q b 2 . . . q b ; 2 initialize i ← 1, k ← 1 and S 0 ← ∅; 3 initialize R ← { r ∈ R | p r while θ R (S k ∪ {r i }) min{q r i , q b k }, or there exist a agent r ∈ S k ∩ R and t < k such that r has an IS-deviation from S k to S t do 7 // add red agents to S k as long as the ratio of red agents does not exceed the minimum virtual peak;
set R ← R \ {r i } and i ← i + 1;
11
// let red agents in S k deviate to smaller-indexed coalitions;
12
if there exists an agent r ∈ S k ∩ R and t < k such that r has an IS-deviation from S k to S t then 13 choose r and S t so that θ R (S t ∪ {r }) is r 's most preferred ratio among the coalitions S t satisfying the above;
set B ← B \ {b k }, and k ← k + 1;
16 // let the remaining agents deviate to mixed coalitions as long as they prefer the ratio of the deviating coalition to half; 17 while there is an agent r ∈ R and a coalition S t such that t 0, θ R (S t ∪ {r }) r 1 2 , and all agents in S t accept a deviation of r to S t do 18 choose r and S t so that θ R (S t ∪ {r }) is r 's most preferred ratio among the coalitions S t satisfying the above;
19
S t ← S t ∪ {r } and R ← R \ {r } ; 20 if R = ∅ and S k consists of a single blue agent then
For each r ∈ S 0 , r is a red agent and r strictly prefers {r } to a mixed pair.
P
. By construction every agent in S 0 is a red agent. Suppose that before joining S 0 , r has joined a mixed coalition S t with t > 0 at Step 9 and then deviated to S 0 at Step 14. Just before r has le S t , the ratio θ of red agents in S t is at least half, implying that θ r 1 2 or θ = 1 2 . Since r joined S 0 at Step 14, we also have 1 r θ . Combining these yields 1 r 1 2 . e claim is immediate when r joined S 0 at Step 19.
We also observe that, by the construction of the algorithm, all default agents belong to the coalition whose red ratio is at most their virtual peak; see Figure (3a) for an illustration. L 4.3. For every default agent i in S t , where S t ∈ π with t > 0, (1) the red ratio of S t is at most i's virtual peak, i.e., θ R (S t ) q i ; and (2) i weakly prefers S t to {i} and to a mixed pair.
. Take any t > 0 and take any default agent i in S t . Before the algorithm starts forming the next coalition S t +1 , the ratio θ R (S t ) remains below q i by the while-condition in Step 6. A er S t +1 starts being formed, θ R (S t ) can only increase by accepting red agents from larger-indexed coalitions. However, if a deviation of some red agent to S t increases the fraction above q i , this would mean that i would not be willing to accept such a deviation. us, θ R (S t ) q i . To show the second statement, recall that p i 1 2 by construction of the algorithm and θ R (S t ) 1 2 by Lemma 4.1. If i is a blue agent, then by single-peakedness i weakly prefers S t both to her own singleton and to a mixed pair. If i is a red agent who has joined S t at Step 9, then by single-peakedness and the fact that he has not deviated to S 0 at Step 14, i weakly prefers S t both to his singleton and to a mixed pair.
We are now ready to prove that no coalition in π admits a deviation of a blue agent. L 4.4. For each S ∈ π , there is an agent in S who does not accept a deviation of a blue agent to S.
. If S ⊆ S 0 and |S | = 1, it follows from Lemma 4.2 that no r ∈ S accepts a deviation of a blue agent. Suppose S = S t for some t > 0, and assume towards a contradiction that some blue agent b ∈ B can be accepted by all agents in S t ∈ π for some t > 0. By Lemma 4.1, the ratio of red agents in S t is at least 1 2 . If the fraction of red agents in S t is at most the peak of some agent, i.e., θ R (S t ) p i for some agent i ∈ S t , this means that
i.e., i would not accept b, a contradiction. Hence, suppose that the fraction of red agents in S t is beyond the maximum peak, i.e., θ R (S t ) > max i ∈S t p i . Take i ∈ S t ∩ B. By Lemma 4.3,
Since p i 1 2 by construction of the algorithm, we have θ R (S t ) > 1 2 , which means that coalition S t contains one blue agent and at least two red agents. Hence, even if one red agent leaves the coalition, its red ratio would be at least half, i.e., 1 2
where the second inequality holds, since otherwise p i θ * < θ R (S t ) q i , which contradicts the fact that q i is i's favorite ratio of the coalitions containing exactly one blue agent. Further, agent i prefers θ R (S t ) to θ * by single-peakedness and by the fact that θ * < θ R (S t ) q i . Since i accepts the deviation of b to S t , a er adding b to S t , the red ratio should remain at least θ * , implying that θ * < θ R (S t ∪ {b}). But this would mean that
. is inequality can be simpli ed to 2|S t ∩ R| < |S t | + 1, implying θ * < 1 2 , a contradiction. Deviations of red agents We will now show that coalitions S 1 , . . . , S k do not admit an IS-deviation by red agents. To this end, we rst observe that the red ratio of a coalition to which a new agent belongs exceeds the virtual peak of the new agent; see Figure ( (b) Virtual peak of a new agent. Fig. 3 . The red ratio of a coalition does not exceed the virtual peak of a default agent, but exceeds the virtual peak of a new agent. L 4.5. Let S be the set of agents that belong to S t with t > 0 a er the while-loop of Step 8 of Algorithm 1, and let r i be the last agent in S to join S t . en no red agent r j with j > i can join S without exceeding the minimum peak, i.e., θ R (S ∪ {r j }) > min{q b t , q r j }.
. Take any r j with j > i. If θ R (S ∪ {r j }) min{q b t , q r j }, then this would mean that θ R (S ∪ {r i+1 }) min{q b t , q r i +1 }, since q r i +1 q r j . Hence the algorithm would have added r i+1 to S, a contradiction. L 4.6. For all S t ∈ π with t > 0 and each new agent r ∈ S t : (1) the red ratio of S t exceeds r 's virtual peak, i.e., θ R (S t ) > q r ; (2) r is the unique new agent in S t ; (3) r weakly prefers S t to {r } and to a mixed pair.
. Let r be the rst new agent who joined S t at Step 14 or Step 19. When r joined S t , his virtual peak q r was at most that of any other red agent in S t . By Lemma 4.5, he cannot join S t without exceeding the virtual peak q r , i.e., θ R (D t ∪ {r }) < q r . us, by single-peakedness, he does not accept any further deviations by red agents. Hence, r is the unique new agent in S t . To see that the third statement holds, note that if r joined S t at Step 19, then r prefers θ R (S t ) to 1 2 by the if-condition of Step 17. Also, r chooses his favorite coalition among the coalitions to which he can deviate, and thus r prefers θ R (S t ) to θ R (S 0 ∪ {r }) = 1. Now suppose that r joined S t from S t with t > t at Step 14. At that point, the ratio θ of red agents in S t was at least half, and agent r weakly prefers S t to a mixed pair since 1 2 θ q r . Hence, since r prefers θ R (S t ) to θ , by transitivity r prefers θ R (S t ) to 1 2 . Also, by the if-condition in Step 12, r prefers S t to being in a singleton coalition.
We also observe that the red ratio of a higher-indexed coalition is smaller than or equal to that of a lower-indexed coalition. L 4.7. Let t t > 0 and let S be the set of agents in S t just a er the while-loop of Step 8.
. Assume for the sake of contradiction that θ R (D t ) > θ R (S) . Since S and D t contain exactly one blue agent, this means that D t contains more red agents than S does, i.e., |S ∩ R| + 1 |D t ∩ R|.
us, even if we add a red agent to S, its red ratio does not exceed θ R (D t ), i.e., for each r ∈ R \ S we have θ R (S ∪ {r }) θ R (D t ). Now recall that by Lemma 4.3, the red ratio of S t does not exceed the virtual peak of each default agent, which means that
Combining these observations, for every r ∈ R \ S we have θ R (S ∪ {r }) min
Moreover, since t = t , or S t has been created a er S t , there is a red agent r j ∈ D t \ S with q r j q r for every r ∈ S ∩ R and q b q b , where b and b are the unique blue agents in D t and S, respectively. Combining this with inequality (4.1) yields θ R (S ∪ {r j }) min
which contradicts Lemma 4.5.
. en some agent in D t does not accept a deviation of a red agent to S t .
, both D t and D t contain exactly one blue agent as well as the same number of red agents. By the description of the algorithm, the minimum virtual peak of agents in D t is smaller than that of agents in D t , i.e., min
Further, by Lemma 4.5, no red agent in D t can join D t without exceeding the minimum virtual peak, which implies that for every r ∈ D t we have min
Combining this with the inequality (4.2) implies min
us, by single-peakedness, there is an agent in D t who does not accept a deviation of a red agent to D t .
We are now ready to show that no coalition in π admits a deviation of a red agent. L 4.9. No agent r ∈ S t ∩ R has an IS-deviation to another coalition S t with 0 < t < t.
P . Suppose towards a contradiction that there is such an agent r ∈ S t ∩ R and a coalition S t with 0 < t < t. Let t be the largest index of coalition S t to which r has an IS-deviation. Observe that if S t contains a new agent, then the new agent does not accept a deviation of agent r by Lemma 4.6; thus, S t has no new agent and S t = D t . If r is a default agent in S t , then r weakly prefers S t to D t and hence r strictly prefers D t ∪ {r } to D t by transitivity. us, agent r could have deviated to S t from S t at Step 14, a contradiction. If r is a new agent in S t , then r joined S t in Step 14 or Step 19, but this means that r could have deviated to S t instead of S t , as r strictly prefers L 4.10 . No agent r ∈ S t ∩ R has an IS-deviation to another coalition S t with t > t.
P . Suppose towards a contradiction that there is such an agent r ∈ S t ∩ R and a coalition S t . Let t > t be the smallest index of coalition S t to which r has an IS-deviation. Again, if S t contains a new agent, then r cannot deviate to S t ; thus, S t = D t , and θ R (S t 
First, consider the case where agent r is a default agent in S t and t > 0. en, by Lemma 4.3 and by the fact that θ R (S t ) θ R (S t ), we have θ R (S t ) θ R (S t ) q r . Since r 's preferences are single-peaked, r has an incentive to join S t only if θ R (S t ) = θ R (S t ); however, by Lemma 4.8 this implies that there is an agent in S t who is not willing to accept r 's deviation, a contradiction.
Second, consider the case where agent r joined S t at Step 14. Let S be the coalition to which the red agent r belonged before joining S t , and let S be the set of agents in S just before r deviated from S to S t at Step 14. Note that S is a coalition that has been created before S t emerged, i.e., t , since otherwise r would have deviated to S t instead of S t at Step 14. By Lemma 4.7, θ R (D t ) is at most θ R (S) and θ R (S) q r by the description of the algorithm. Now we have
Recall that r strictly prefers S t to S; thus, by single-peakedness, r has an incentive to deviate from
θ R (S) by Lemma 4.7, this means that θ R (D t ) = θ R (D ). Also, if < t , some agent in D t does not accept the deviation of r by Lemma 4.8, and hence = t . us, agent r deviated from S t to S t and later the coalition S t regained the same number of red agents as before. Now, if θ R (S) = q r , then r would not have le the coalition S at Step 14; hence θ R (S) < q r , which implies θ R (D t ∪ {r }) q r . Recall that by Lemma 4.3, the red ratio of D t is at most the minimum virtual peak, i.e., θ R (D t ) min x ∈D t q x . If adding r to D t exceeds the minimum, some agent would not accept a deviation of r ; thus, we have
, there is at least one red agent r j ∈ D t who does not belong to S.
contradicting Lemma 4.5. Finally, consider the case where r joined S t at Step 19. Since S t does not contain any new agents, agent r could have joined S t instead of S t at Step 19, a contradiction.
Algorithm for individual stability
We will now construct an individually stable outcome using the algorithm described in Section 4.1 as a subroutine. Suppose that we are given a diversity game (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ). For each i ∈ R ∪ B, we denote by B i the preference over the ratios of the blue agents in each coalition:
Now let π R , π B , π pair , and π single denote the partitions computed by Algorithm 2, and let π = π R ∪π B ∪π pair ∪π single . Arguing as in the previous section, we can establish the following properties. L 4.11. For each A ∈ {R, B} and each coalition S ∈ π A it holds that: (a) S is individually rational; (b) if i joined S at Step 11, then i does not accept a further deviation of an agent in A to S; (c) there is an agent who does not admit a deviation of an agent in N \ A; (d) for each agent i ∈ S who joined S before Step 11 of Algorithm 2, i weakly prefers S to a mixed pair.
P . Without loss of generality suppose that A is the set of red agents. Claim (a) (individual rationality) holds due to Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6 and the while-condition in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.
To show claim (b), suppose that a red agent r is the rst agent who joined S ∈ π R at Step 11. By single-peakedness, the claim holds when p r 1 2 ; so suppose p r > 1 2 . Since r did not belong to any of the coalitions in π R before, his virtual peak q r is at most that of any other red agent in S. Since all agents in S \ {r } accept r at Step 9 of Algorithm 2, S did not contain a new agent by Lemma 4.6, so the red ratio of S \ {r } is at most the minimum virtual peak of agents in S \ {r } by Lemma Algorithm 2: Algorithm for an individually stable outcome input : A single-peaked diversity game (R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) output : π 1 make mixed coalitions with red majority, i.e., set π R = HALF(R, B, ( i ) i ∈R∪B ) ; 2 let R le ← R \ S ∈π R S and B le ← B \ S ∈π R S; 3 make mixed coalitions with blue majority, i.e., set π B = HALF(B le , R le , ( B i ) i ∈R le ∪B le ); 4 set R le ← R le \ S ∈π B S, and B le ← B le \ S ∈π B S; 5 make mixed pairs from remaining agents in R le and B le who prefer a coalition of ratio 1 2 to his or her own singleton; add them to π pair ; 6 set R le ← R le \ S ∈π pair S, and B le ← B le \ S ∈π pair S; 7 // let the remaining agents deviate to mixed coalitions as long as they prefer the deviating coalition to his or her singleton; 8 foreach A ∈ {R, B} do 9 while there is a agent i ∈ A le and a mixed coalition S ∈ π A such that S ∪ {i} is individually rational and all agents in S accept a deviation of i to S do 10 choose such pair i and S where θ A (S ∪ {i}) is i's most preferred ratio among the coalitions S satisfying the above;
12 put all the remaining agents in R le and B le into singletons, and add them to π single ;
4.3 and this remains true a er accepting r . However, by Lemma 4.5, agent r cannot join S without exceeding either the virtual peak of the unique blue agent or the virtual peak q r ; thus, θ R (S) < q r . By single-peakedness, we conclude that r does not accept any further deviation of red agents. To prove claim (c), we can use the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.4. To establish claim (d), we recall that each agent i ∈ S weakly prefers S to a mixed pair by Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6; by transitivity, this still holds a er accepting the deviation of red agents at Step 11 of Algorithm 2. L 4.12. Mixed pairs created at Step 5 of Algorithm 2 do not admit an IS-deviation. P . Let R and B be the set of red and blue agents in R le and B le just before Step 5 of Algorithm 2, respectively. Note that both R and B are non-empty only if red agents (respectively, blue agents) are le when mixed coalitions with red majority have been formed, and blue agents (respectively, red agents) are le when mixed coalitions with blue majority have been formed. So, the red agents in R and the blue agents in B have opposite peaks, i.e., we have either P . We rst observe that π is individually rational. Indeed, all singletons in π are individually rational. Also, all mixed pairs are individually rational, since they prefer a coalition of ratio 1 2 to being in a singleton coalition. All coalitions in π R and π B are individually rational by Lemma 4.11(a).
We will now show that π satis es individual stability. Take any red agent r ∈ R. We note that by individual rationality r has no incentive to deviate to red-only coalitions; also, by Lemma 4.12, r cannot deviate to a coalition in π pair . Further, by Lemma 4.11(c), agent r has no IS-deviation to a coalition in π B . us, it remains to check whether r has an IS-deviation to a coalition in π R , or a blue singleton in π single . Consider the following cases:
(1) Agent r joined S ∈ π R before Step 11 of Algorithm 2. By Lemmas 4.3 and 4.6, agent r weakly prefers S to a mixed pair before accepting the deviation of red agents at Step 11 of Algorithm 2, and by transitivity, this remains true a er Step 11 of Algorithm 2, meaning that r does not have an incentive to join a blue singleton. Also, r has no IS-deviation to a coalition in π R by Lemmata 4.9 and 4.10.
(2) Agent r joined S ∈ π R at Step 11 of Algorithm 2. By individual rationality, agent r weakly prefers his coalition to forming his own singleton. Hence, if r has an IS-deviation to a coalition of a single blue agent in π single , then it means that both agent strictly prefer a mixed pair to their own singleton coalitions and hence they would have formed a pair at Step 5, a contradiction. Also, if agent r has an IS-deviation to some coalition T ∈ π R , then it means that no red agent joined T at Step 11 of Algorithm 2 by Lemma 4.11(c), and thus agent r would have joined T instead of S, a contradiction.
(3) Agent r belongs to a coalition S ∈ π B . By construction of the algorithm, we have p r 1 2 , and agent r weakly prefers S to a mixed pair before accepting the deviation of blue agents at Step 11 of Algorithm 2. By transitivity, this remains true a er Step 11 of Algorithm 2, which means that r prefers his coalition to a coalition with blue ratio at most 1 2 . us, r has no incentive to deviate to a coalition in π R , or to a blue-only coalition. (4) Agent r belongs to a coalition in π pair . Clearly, agent r has no incentive to deviate to singleton coalitions of blue agents. Also, if r has an IS-deviation to some coalition T ∈ π R , r would have joined T at Step 19 of Algorithm 1, a contradiction.
(5) Agent r belongs to a coalition in π single . Again, if r has an IS-deviation to some coalition T ∈ π R , r could have joined T at Step 11 of Algorithm 2, a contradiction. Also, if r has an IS-deviation to some coalition in π single that consists of a single blue agent b, then both r and b could have formed a pair at Step 5, a contradiction.
A symmetric argument applies to blue agents' deviations, and hence no blue agent has an IS-deviation to other coalitions.
CONCLUSION
We have initiated the formal study of coalition formation games with varying degree of homophily and heterophily. Our results suggest several directions for future work.
First, while we have argued that Nash stable outcomes may fail to exist, the complexity of deciding whether a given diversity game admits a Nash stable outcome remains unknown. Also, we have obtained an existence result for individual stability under the assumption that agent's preferences are single-peaked, but it is not clear if the single-peakedness assumption is necessary; in fact, we do not have an example of a diversity game with no individually stable outcome. In a similar vein, it would be desirable to identify further special classes of diversity games that admit core stable outcomes or at least e cient algorithms for deciding whether the core is non-empty.
More broadly, it would be interesting to extend our model to more than two agent types. Another possible extension is to consider the se ing where agents are located on a social network, and each agent's preference over coalitions is determined by the fraction of her acquaintances in these coalitions; this model would capture both the se ing considered in our work and fractional hedonic games.
